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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARGINAL WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY IN THE
HEDONIC AND DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS
MAISY WONG
ABSTRACT. The two primary approaches to estimate marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP)
for differentiated goods are hedonics (Rosen, 1974) and discrete choice models (McFadden,
1974). Researchers have alluded to a duality between both models. The innovation in this pa-
per is to show that the hedonic MWTP can be written as a function of choice probabilities in
the discrete choice model. I find that the hedonic method estimates a weighted average of mar-
ginal utilities where higher weights are associated with consumer types whose choice prob-
abilities indicate a high variance regarding their choice (marginal consumers). This weight
decreases as choice probabilities approach 0 or 1.
1. INTRODUCTION
Willingness-to-pay is important for welfare analysis. The two primary approaches to es-
timate willingness-to-pay (WTP) for differentiated goods are hedonics (Rosen, 1974) and
discrete choice models (McFadden, 1974). These two approaches have been implemented
to estimate parameters of interests in the fields of development, education, environmental,
industrial organization, labor and urban economics, including the WTP for air quality, hous-
ing, automobiles and school quality, to name a few.1 Despite a large body of literature that
I am indebted to Fernando Ferreira for his guidance and time. I thank Kenneth Chay, HanMing Fang, Alex Gel-
ber, Michael Greenstone, Joe Gyourko, Mark Jenkins, Nicolai Kuminoff, Jeremy Tobacman and participants at
the CSWEP Mentoring Workshop and the Wharton Applied Economics Workshop provided valuable feedback.
Lee Hye Jin provided excellent research assistance. All errors are my own.
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Kremer, Leino, Miguel, & Zwane (2009); Wong (2008), for a few examples in different fields in the applied
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employs these two approaches, to my knowledge, there is no theoretical analysis of the rela-
tionship between the two models.2 Moreover, some papers that used both models to estimate
WTP found different results. For example, Banzhaf (2002) finds that the WTP for the same
change in air quality varies between $8 (hedonics) to $18-$25 (discrete choice) using the
same data.
Economists have alluded to the duality between both the hedonic and discrete choice models.
Cropper, Deck, Kishor, & McConnell (1993) and Mason & Quigley (1990) use simulations
to compare preference estimates from a traditional Rosen hedonic model to the traditional
McFadden multinomial Logit. Bayer, Ferreira, & McMillan (2007) discuss parallels in the
aggregate estimating equation in a discrete choice model with random coefficients to the
estimating equation in a hedonic regression framework. Wheaton (1974) studies Rosen’s
bid-rent functions with discrete products.3 These papers focus on aggregate consumer be-
havior in both models but I find that consumer heterogeneity will turn out to be an important
distinguishing feature.
This paper shows that the hedonic MWTP can be written as a function of choice probabil-
ities in the discrete choice model. I begin with a random coefficient, discrete choice Logit
model where consumers have heterogeneous taste for products (the Logit error) and product
characteristics.4 They choose one among several discrete products to maximize utility. An
equilibrium is a vector of prices and an allocation of products such that no consumers have
an incentive to deviate from their choices. This discrete choice Logit model has an aggregate
probability function that summarizes the probability that consumers choose a product, given
equilibrium prices.
2Feenstra (1995) studies the theoretical properties of exact hedonic price indexes in a setting with discrete
products but does not compare WTP in both models.
3Kuminoff & Jarrah (2010) adds heterogeneity to Wheaton (1974) but does not compare discrete choice and
hedonics explicitly.
4There are multiple discrete choice frameworks, including models with a probit error and with no Logit error.
I start with the Logit model because it is the most common framework in the literature on consumer WTP and
the solutions have tractable functional forms.
Rosen’s hedonic model is a dual way to describe equilibrium in a market with differentiated
goods.5 I investigate how probability functions in the random coefficients Logit model relates
to the gradient of the hedonic price function, the first step to identifying the MWTP function
in Rosen’s hedonic model.6 Rosen (1974) showed that a consumer choosing to buy a differ-
entiated good will maximize his utility when his indifference curve is tangent to the hedonic
price function. Using the first order conditions from a consumer optimization problem, he
showed that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between a characteristic of the differ-
entiated good and the numeraire good is equal to the gradient of the hedonic price function,
evaluated at the optimal levels of product characteristics. Therefore, the gradient of the he-
donic price function helps to identify MWTP for product characteristics from the tangencies.
A popular rule of thumb by practitioners is to use the discrete choice framework when the
number of products is small and the hedonic framework when the number of products is
large. Since Rosen’s model assumes a continuum of products, the more products in a mar-
ket, the better the empirical setting approximates this assumption. There is also a practical
reason-computational power-because discrete choice models with many products are compu-
tationally costly to estimate. Recently, with the rise in computational power, there are more
settings where both the discrete choice model and the hedonic model have been employed
(eg. housing). Therefore, it is important to know how the hedonic model performs in a set-
ting with discrete products. To investigate this rule of thumb, I explore a hedonic model with
fixed costs where consumers and producers still optimize over a continuous set of alterna-
tives in product characteristics and indifference curves and isoprofit curves are differentiable.
5The seminal Rosen paper maps out a two-step methodology to estimate the average MWTP function of con-
sumers. Recently, Ekeland, Heckman, & Nesheim (2004); Heckman, Matzkin, & Nesheim (2010) and Bajari
& Benkard (2005) revisit the Rosen model. There is a consensus that the second step of the Rosen model has
not been implemented successfully (Deacon et al., 1998; Chay & Greenstone, 2004) while the recent papers are
still relatively new. For these reasons, I focus on the one-step hedonic approach, which is the most common
application of the hedonic method to date.
6The first step of Rosen’s hedonic model estimates the hedonic price function, which is a necessary step to
estimating the MWTP function in the second step.
However, some products are no longer profitable to produce due to fixed costs, so the set of
products in equilibrium is no longer a continuum.
With a discrete product space, consumer heterogeneity has important implications on whether
the hedonic model can identify average MWTP in the population.(Nesheim, 2006) In the tra-
ditional Rosen framework, there is a continuum of consumers choosing amongst a continuum
of products to maximize utility. In this setting, the indifference cuves of all consumers are
tangent to the hedonic price function so that all consumers are just indifferent and all con-
sumers are marginal consumers. In such a model, the average MWTP function of marginal
consumers is also the average MWTP function of the population. With a discrete product
space, some consumers may be inframarginal in equilibrium (they do not have an incentive
to deviate from their choice but their indifference curves are not tangent to the hedonic price
function). Therefore, the gradient of the hedonic price function may not identify the average
MWTP of the population.
The main finding in this paper is that the gradient of the hedonic price function is the ra-
tio of a weighted average of individual marginal utilites, where the weights are a function
of choice probabilities in the discrete choice Logit model. To give an example that relates
this insight to the probability weights in the discrete choice model, consider a consumer type
whose probability of choosing a product is one (zero). I find that the first step of the hedonic
method cannot identify MWTP of these consumers (their weight is zero). This is because
these are consumers who choose (not choose) a product with certainty (inframarginal con-
sumers). More generally, I find that higher weights are associated with the marginal utilities
of consumer types whose choice probabilities indicate more variation regarding their choices
(marginal consumers). As this choice probability approaches 0 or 1, the weights start to
decrease to zero.
Using the probability weights above, I show that average MWTP in the traditional McFadden
Logit model is exactly equal to the gradient of the hedonic price function. However, I show
that this is a special case. With heterogeneity in taste for product characteristics, both models
are not necessarily duals of each other. This is because the ratio of a weighted average of
marginal utilities (the hedonic price gradient) is not the same as the average ratio of marginal
utilities (average MWTP in the random coefficients Logit model). Both are identical only
when the probability weights and the marginal utilities are the same for all consumer types
(this is the special case of the McFadden Logit model).
Many policy-relevant papers are interested in preferences of the marginal consumer, the mean
consumer or both (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005; Carneiro, Heckman, & Vytlacil, 2005). Chay
& Greenstone (2004) estimate a hedonic model in the housing market with a correlated ran-
dom coefficients framework to test whether the marginal consumer differs from the mean
consumer in the presence of sorting. This paper shows that higher moments in choice data
can be used to investigate how marginal consumers differs from the mean consumers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, I set up a random
coefficients discrete choice Logit model and investigate how it relates to the Rosen hedonic
model with fixed costs. Then, I derive the gradient of the hedonic price function as a function
of choice probabilities in the Logit model. Finally, I conclude.
2. THEORY
2.1. Discrete choice model with Logit. Consumer preferences
There are t = 1, ...,T markets and each market has Jt products. This is a multinomial discrete
choice model where the probability that consumer i in market t chooses product j is pii jt .
These choice probabilities arise from a utility framework where consumer i’s indirect utility
from choosing product j in market t is,
(2.1) ui jt =V (x jt , p jt ;βi)+ εi jt
where yi is income, p jt is product price, x jt is a K-dimensional (row) vector of product char-
acteristics, εi jt is a mean-zero stochastic term.7 The price of the numeraire good, yi− p jt ,
is normalized to 1. For the main result in this paper, the important assumption is that εi jt is
additive and separable from V () and drawn from a Type I extreme value distribution. I will
assume that each market is independent from other markets. To simplify the notation, I will
drop the market subscript, t, from here. Each consumer of type i represents a population of
measure 1 where each type has random taste parameters for products (drawn from F (ε)) and
product characteristics (drawn from F (β )). The model is closed with an outside good, j= 0,
and the utility from the outside good is normalized to 0.
A common functional form for V (x jt , p jt ;βi) in the discrete choice literature is the random
coefficients utility function: V (x jt , p jt ;βi) = x jtβi+βiP(yi− p jt)8 In this random coefficients
discrete choice model, the average MWTP for characteristic k is
(2.2) WTPDCMk =
ˆ
βik
βiP
dF(β )
Choice probabilities
Consumers purchase one unit of j that offers the highest utility.9 The probability that type i
chooses product j is derived from differences in utility, Pr(ui j−uik > 0,∀ j 6= k). Let A j be
the set of individuals who choose j
(2.3) A j(x., p.,δ ) =
{
βi,εi0,εi1, ...,εiJ|ui j−uik ≥ 0,k = 0, ...,J
}
To obtain the aggregate probability that product j is chosen, pi j, we aggregate over all indi-
viduals in the market who chose product j,
7Some discrete choice models include a term, ξ jt , which represents the unobserved quality of the product. This
distinction is not important for the main result in this paper.
8Although this functional form is flexible (McFadden & Train, 2000), it places restrictions, especially on income
effects. One can also model piecewise income effects or Cobb-Douglas utility (see Petrin (2002) and Berry,
Levinsohn, & Pakes (1995)). The intuition behind the result will be the same.
9While this is standard in the literature, this assumption can be relaxed easily (Rosen, 1974).
pi j () =
ˆ
A j
dF(β )dF(ε)(2.4)
=
ˆ
exp(Vi j)
∑ j
′=J
j′=0 exp
(
Vi j′
)dF(β )
≡
ˆ
pii j ()dF(β )
A consequence of the distributional assumption of the Logit error (ε) is that individual choice
probabilities, pii j, assumes the Logit form, pii j =
exp(Vi j)
∑ j′ exp(Vi j′)
. Given a fixed supply, an equi-
librium is represented by a vector of equilibrium prices and an allocation of products to con-
sumers so that no one has an incentive to change their choices. The J-dimensional vector, pi∗,
summarizes the probability that consumers in the market choose product j, as a function of
product characteristics and prices. Each element in this vector, pi∗j , is the probability function
evaluated at the equilibrium quantities of product characteristics, pi(x∗j , p∗j).
2.2. Hedonic model. The hedonic model offers a dual way to describe a differentiated goods
equilibrium. There is a continuum of products and a continuum of consumer types. To allow
for a discrete product space in the Rosen model, I augment it to allow for fixed costs in the
supply side. Consumers and producers optimize over a continuous set of alternatives so that
indifference and isoprofit curves are continuous and differentiable but the set of products in
equilibrium may not be a continuum because some products are not profitable due to fixed
costs.
Producer problem
Let the cost to produce a product with a vector of characteristics, x, be C(x) + ci, where
C(.) is convex and the marginal cost of each characteristic, ∂C/∂xk, is positive and increasing.
Without loss of generality, I assume that the first characteristic, x1, has fixed cost of ci for
producer i. For example, the product could be local newspapers and the first characteristic
could be the number of pages with color. The fixed cost would be the cost to purchase a color
printer. There is a continuum of producer types where ω i is type i’s cost parameter. The
producer’s problem is to choose a product, x, to maximize profits.10
max{xk}kpi(x) = P(x)− (C(x1, ...,xK;ω i)+ ci) s.t. pi(x)> 0
A profit-maximizing producer i will produce xk such that the marginal cost is equal to the
marginal revenue, ∂C∂xk =
∂P
∂xk
. For characteristic 1, producers will also need to compare the
variable profit holding other characteristics at the optimum level, (P(x)−C(x1,x∗2,...,x∗K;ω i)),
to the fixed cost. If x
′
1 satisfies the first order condition but P((x
′
1,x
∗
−1)−C(x
′
1,x
∗
−1;ω
i) <
ci, then the producer produces x∗1 such that total profits is at the boundary condition, pi =
P(x∗)−C(x∗;ω i)− ci = 0. Each producer takes the market price, P(x), as the maximum
price obtainable for model x.
Consumer problem
The consumer problem for differentiated goods is analogous. There is a continuum of con-
sumer types. Type i will choose one unit of a product to maximize utility, U i, subject to
the budget constraint, P(x)+numeraire6 yi. Consumers take the market price, P(x), as the
minimum price needed for product x. Optimality is achieved when the ratio of the marginal
utilities for xk and the numeraire is equal to the ratio of the marginal costs for characteristic k
and the numeraire (normalized to have a price of 1), ∂P∂xk =
∂Ui/∂xk
∂Ui/∂P
.11
Equilibrium
An equilibrium is characterized by consumers and producers who are maximizing utilities
and profits so that no one has an incentive to change their choices. Prices adjust so that the
marginal consumer and the marginal producer are just indifferent in equilibrium and each
point on the hedonic price function is a consumer/producer indifference condition (
∂Ui/∂xk
∂Ui/∂P
=
∂P
∂xk
= ∂C∂xk
). Equilibrium interactions of consumers and producers in a market trace out this
10I assume that each producer considers producing 1 product only. See Rosen (1974) for a discussion on
relaxing this assumption.
11As discussed in the original Rosen paper, second order conditions are satisfied provided utility functions
follow the standard assumptions and the price function is not too concave.
price-characteristic locus that defines a market clearing, implicit (hedonic) price function,
P(x).
In principle, the hedonic approach can be used to recover consumer’s MWTP function (also
known as the bid function). Rosen proposed a 2-step method. The idea behind the first
step is that the hedonic locus traces out the tangencies between the marginal consumers’ bid
functions and the marginal producers’ offer functions. In the first step, the hedonic price
function is estimated by projecting product prices onto the space of product characteristics.
The estimated function is used to predict the product specific marginal (hedonic) prices for
characteristic k, ∂Pj/∂x jk. The first order conditions show that this estimated gradient identifies
MWTP at the equilibrium points. To estimate MWTP away from the equilibrium points, the
second step uses consumer and producer data as demand and cost shifters to estimate the
MWTP function and the compensated supply function simultaneously. However, there is a
consensus that empirical applications have not identified a situation in which the identification
assumptions for the second step holds. 12 Therefore, the literature has instead focused on the
first step, estimating the hedonic price function. This one-step hedonic method is necessary
to identify MWTP, and with additional assumptions, is also sufficient to estimate MWTP for
the representative consumer (see Muelbauer (1974) and Rosen (1974) and a discussion of
applications to price indexes in Pakes (2003)).
In the Rosen model with no fixed costs and a continuum of producer and consumer types, all
consumers and producers are located on the tangencies in equilibrium. In other words, each
consumer and producer is indifferent and hence is a marginal consumer/producer. If there
exists a consumer i and a producer i′ such that ∂U
i/∂x1
∂Ui/∂P
> ∂C
i′
∂x1
, then both have an incentive to
deviate. The consumer gains by consuming more x1 as long as
∂Ui/∂xk
∂Ui/∂P
− ∂P∂xk > 0 and it is prof-
itable for the producer to produce more x1 as long as ∂P∂xk −
∂C
∂xk
> 0. Therefore, in equilibrium,
all consumers and producers are tangent to the hedonic price function so that the gradient of
12See Deacon, Brookshire, Fisher, Kneese, Kolstad, Scrogin, Smith, Ward, & Wilen (1998) and Chay & Green-
stone (2004). Recently, some researchers have revisited this question (see Bajari & Benkard (2005); Bishop &
Timmins (2008); Heckman, Matzkin, & Nesheim (2010); Kuminoff, Parmeter, & Jaren Pope)
the hedonic price function at each point, ∂P∂xk , identifies each consumer’s MWTP for that
characteristic and each producer’s marginal cost of producing that characteristic around the
equilibrium points. With a continuum of producer types but only one type of consumer, the
family of bid functions degenerates to a single surface and P(x) must be everywhere identical
with a unique family of MWTP functions for the representative consumer (who is also the
marginal consumer and the average consumer).
With fixed costs, however, some consumers may not be tangent to the hedonic price function.
For example, the utility-maximizing choice for some consumers could be where
∂Ui/∂x1
∂Ui/∂P
> ∂P∂x1
,
so that they would like to consumer more of characteristic 1. Even if there exists producers
i′ such that ∂C
i′
∂x1
<
∂Ui/∂x1
∂Ui/∂P
, it may not be profitable for producers to produce more x1 due to
fixed costs. Since the bid function that maximizes their utility is not tangent to the hedonic
price function, the gradient of the hedonic price function cannot identify MWTP for these
consumers. They are inframarginal in that they are not indifferent but have no incentive to
change their choices.
Therefore, the hedonic model with fixed costs has implications for the interpretation of the
hedonic gradient as average MWTP in the population.13 If an equilibrium is associated with a
set of inframarginal consumers whose utility-maximizing indifference curves are not tangent
to the hedonic price function, the one step hedonic method can only identify the average
MWTP for marginal consumers. This could be problematic because MWTP of the marginal
consumer could be different than MWTP of the average consumer but the econometrician
cannot observe who is marginal.
13Instead of fixed costs, other sources of friction can produce the same result where some consumers are infra-
marginal. For example, with transaction costs, some consumers’ indifference curve may not be tangent to the
hedonic price function but still may not have an incentive to change their choices because of transaction costs.
Regulations that restrict choice sets could also cause non-tangencies in equilibrium(Rosen, 1974).
3. COMPARING HEDONIC AND DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS
Theorem 1. Let consumer utility from good j be Ui j = V (X j;βi)+ εi j where X j is a vector
of characteristics of product j; βi indexes consumer i’s taste for product characteristics,
drawn from the distribution F (β ) and εi j is an idiosyncratic taste shock drawn from a Type
I extreme value distribution, assumed independent from F (β ). Let pii j denote the probability
that consumer i chooses product j. If an equilibrium exists that can be represented by a
hedonic price function, then, the gradient of the hedonic price function for that equilibrium
is a function of the choice probabilities, pii j.14
Proof. [see Theorem 15.7 in Simon & Blume (1994)] Let pi1, ...,piJ : RJ(K+1) → R1 be C1
functions. Consider a system of equations in an equilibrium, with constants pi∗1 , ...,pi
∗
J ,
pi1(p1, ..., pJ,x11, ...,x1K, ...,x jk, ...,xJ1, ...,xJK) = pi∗1
...
...
piJ(p1, ..., pJ,x11, ...,x1K, ...,x jk, ...,xJ1, ...,xJK) = pi∗J(3.1)
as possibly defining p1, ..., pJ as implicit functions of x11, ...,xJK. Suppose that (p*,x*) is a
solution of Equation 3.1. If the determinant of the JxJ matrix
∂pi1
∂ p1
· · · ∂pi1∂ pJ
... . . .
...
∂piJ
∂ p1
· · · ∂piJ∂ pJ

evaluated at (p*,x*) is nonzero so that the matrix is invertible, then there exist C1 functions
14When the utility function has a Logit error, consumers have idiosyncratic taste shocks for products, εi j. An
equilibrium could exist with two products that share the same characteristics but different prices. Consumers
would still demand the product with the higher price if they have a high taste shock for that product.Therefore,
a hedonic price function may not exist for every equilibria in the discrete choice Logit model because the
characterisic-price mapping may not be 1-1.
(3.2)
P1(x11, ...,xJK) = p1
PJ(x11, ...,xJK) = pJ
defined on a ball B about x∗ such that
pi1(P1(x), ...,PJ(x),x11, ...,x1K, ...x jk, ...,xJ1, ...,xJK) = pi∗1(3.3)
...
piJ(P1(x), ...,PJ(x),x11, ...,x1K, ...x jk, ...,xJ1, ...,xJK) = pi∗J
for all x= (x11, ...,xJK) in B.
And the gradient of the implicit price function with respect to x jk is
(3.4)

∂P1/∂x jk
...
∂PJ/∂x jk
=−

∂pi1
∂ p1
· · · ∂pi1∂ pJ
... . . .
...
∂piJ
∂ p1
· · · ∂piJ∂ pJ

−1
∂pi1/∂x jk
...
∂piJ/∂x jk

Since ε is Type I exteme value, additive and independent from F (β ), pi j =
´ exp(Vi j)
∑ j′ exp(Vi j′)
dF(β ),
∂pi j
∂x jk
=
´ ∂Vi j
∂x jk
pii j(1− pii j)dF(β ) and ∂pi j∂x j′k =
´ ∂Vi j
∂x j′k
pii jpii j′ dF(β )∀ j 6= j′. Similarly for ∂pi j∂Pj .

Corollary. If the hedonic price function, P(), is only a function of own-product character-
istics, so that ∂Pj∂x j′k
= ∂P(x)∂x j′k
| x=x∗j = 0∀ j′ 6= j, then the gradient of the hedonic price function
is the ratio of a weighted average of marginal utilities, where the weights are a function of
choice probabilities in the discrete choice model.
Proof. Differentiating each row j of equation (3.3) with respect to x jk,
∂pi1
∂P1
∂P1
∂x1k
= −
(
∂pi1
∂x1k
)
...
∂piJ
∂PJ
∂PJ
∂xJk
= −
(
∂piJ
∂xJk
)
(3.5)
Therefore,
(3.6)

∂P1/∂x1k
...
∂PJ/∂xJk
=−

∂pi1
∂ p1
0 0
0 . . . 0
0 0 ∂pi∂ pJ

−1
∂pi1/∂x1k
...
∂piJ/∂xJk
=−

´ ∂Vi1
∂x1k
wi1dF(β )´ ∂Vi1
∂P1
wi1dF(β )
...´ ∂ViJ
∂xJk
wiJdF(β )´ ∂Vi
∂PJ
wiJdF(β )

where wi j = pii j ∗ (1−pii j)∀ j. 
Just as equilibrium conditions in the hedonic model defines the hedonic price function and its
gradient implicitly, so does a discrete choice model. Theorem 1 uses the Implicit Function
Theorem to relate the equilibrium price functions in both models using choice probabilities.
The weights are intuitive. They are the variance in a multinomial probability distribution,
with probability type i choosing product j, pii j. When pii j is 0 or 1, none or all consumers
of type i are not choosing/choosing product j such that the variance is 0. When pii j = 0.5,
half of type i consumers choose product j and the variance is the highest because marginal
improvements in x jk can tip the consumers to change their choices.
Equilibrium conditions in the hedonic model provides economic content to the probability
weights. When the set of products is discrete, not all consumers are at the tangency. The he-
donic gradient is only identified for consumers at the tangency (marginal consumers). Since
these consumers are just indifferent, their choices have the highest variance. Consumer types
with probabilities close to 0 or 1 have a small variance and are not likely to be at the tangency
(these are inframarginal consumers).
The functional form of these weights is related to the distributional assumption of ε . The
weights depend on how pii j changes for marginal changes to x jk. Due to this assumption,
the individual choice probability, pii j, is a sigmoid-shaped function of individual utility, pii j =
exp(Vi j)
∑ j′ exp(Vi j′)
.15 When Vi j is low relative to the utility for other choices, pii j is close to 0 and a
small improvement in x jk may increase Vi j but is unlikely to make it higher than the utility
for other choices. Therefore, this will have little effect on the probability of it being chosen.
The sigmoid shape implies that a marginal improvement in x jk leads to a small change in pii j
if the choice probability is close to 0 or 1, but the change is steepest when pii j is 0.5.
Equation 3.6 suggests one could use numerical derivatives to explore the relationship between
hedonics and discrete choice models with other distributional assumptions (Probit models or
no Logit errors) even though these models do not have choice probabilities with analytical
functional forms. The model with no Logit error (Berry & Pakes, 2007) is particularly inter-
esting because standard utility functions in hedonics do not have the Logit error term.
Equation (3.6) also nests the traditional McFadden model (Ui j = V (X j)+ εi j) as a special
case. In this case, pi j =
exp(V j)
∑ j′ exp(V j′)
so that ∂Pj∂x jk =−
∂pi j/∂x jk
∂pi j/∂Pj
=−(∂Vj/∂x jk)pi j(1−pi j)
(∂Vj/∂Pj)pi j(1−pi j)
=−(∂Vj/∂x jk)
(∂Vj/∂Pj)
.
Therefore, a regression estimate of the average gradient of the hedonic price function would
equal the average MWTP in the discrete choice model. This is because in the traditional
McFadden Logit model, there is no heterogeneity in the taste for product characteristics and
only heterogeneity in the taste for products (εi j). Therefore, the taste for characteristic k is
represented by only one family of bid functions for characteristic k, with gradient−(∂Vj/∂x jk)
(∂Vj/∂Pj)
.
In this setting with a distribution of products but no heterogeneity in the taste for product
characteristics, the hedonic price function is the bid function and MWTP in the discrete
choice model is the same as the MWTP in the hedonic model.
15Note also that this distributional assumption ensures that choice probabilities are strictly positive always and
the partial derivatives will be well-defined.
Beyond the McFadden Logit model, I do not find evidence supporting duality between MWTP
in both models. This is easiest to see in a random coefficients utility model where the mar-
ginal utilities are ∂Vi j/∂x jk = βik. In this case, the population average MWTP for characteristic
k is
MWTPDk =
ˆ
MWTPikdF(β ) =
ˆ
βik
βiP
dF(β )
and each element in the vector (3.6) is
∂Pj/∂x jk =
´
βikpii j(1−pii j)dF(βi)´
βiPpii j(1−pii j)dF(βi)
Unless the average of the ratio of marginal utilities (MWTPDk ) is equal to the average of the
ratio of weighted averages of marginal utilities (equation (3.6)), it is unlikely that the MWTP
in both models will be the same. Even in the case where the weights are the same for each
individual, so that the ratio of the weighted average is just the ratio of the average (
´
βikdF(βi)´
βiPdF(βi)
),
it is still not the average of the ratios (MWTPDk ) unless the marginal utilities are the same for
all individuals. This is the special case of the McFadden Logit model whereUi j =V (X j)+εi j
and the marginal utility for characteristic k is ∂V j/∂x jk.
In principle, given the distributional assumptions, the discrete choice model identifies a full
distribution of MWTP, F(WTPDi ) but it is computationally costly to estimate such a model.
One goal in this paper is to see whether there exists a mapping between hedonic MWTP
and discrete choice MWTP (MWTPHk = f (MWTP
D
k ) and MWTP
D
k = f
−1 (MWTPHk )). This
mapping would be helpful because the hedonic model requires less computational time to
estimate. The results above suggest that such a mapping is unlikely to be 1-1, except in the
special case where the choice variance and marginal utilities are equal for all consumers.
How do the MWTP’s differ?
The marginal consumers in an equilibrium are the consumers who satisfy the set of indif-
ference conditions in the equilibrium (
∂Ui/∂xk
∂Ui/∂P
= ∂P∂xk
). In the one-step Rosen method, only
product characteristics data is used to estimate the hedonic price function. Econometricians
cannot observe who the marginal consumer is but Equation (3.6) shows how the econometri-
cian can use an estimate of the variance around the choices to estimate which type is likely to
be the marginal consumer. With data on observed heterogeneity (eg. income, age, race and
education), the sample can be stratified into different consumer types. A consistent estimate
of the choice probability, sˆi j, is the percent of consumers of type i choosing product j and
the variance is sˆi j ∗ (1− sˆi j). Equation (3.6) shows that the first step of the Rosen method is
associated with higher weights for the preferences of consumer types whose sample choice
variance is the highest. These are the consumers who are most likely to be the marginal con-
sumers. If the weights are unequal across consumer types, then not all consumers are likely
to be marginal and hence the hedonice gradient is unlikely to identify the average MWTP of
the population. Furthermore, the MWTP estimates for both models will likely differ.
4. CONCLUSION
Willingness-to-pay is important for welfare analysis. The two primary approaches to estimate
willingness-to-pay (WTP) are hedonics (Rosen, 1974) and discrete choice models (McFad-
den, 1974). For many years, researchers have alluded to the apparent duality between both
theories. The innovation in this paper is to show that the hedonic gradient can be written as
a function of choice probabilities in the discrete choice model. The main finding is that the
gradient of the hedonic price function is a ratio of a weighted average of individual marginal
utilites, where the weights are a function of choice probabilities in the discrete choice model.
Consistent with previous literature, higher weights are associated with marginal consumers
who are apt to have higher choice variances. Beyond the McFadden Logit model, I find that
both models are not likely to be duals of each other.
In on-going research, I extend the relationship to other discrete choice models, including
Probit and a model with no Logit error.
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